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Single Idea 7958
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
]
Full Idea
Trope Nominalism says properties are classes or sets of exactly similar or resembling tropes, where tropes are what we might called 'property-tokens' or 'particularized properties'.
Gist of Idea
Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars
Source
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6)
Book Ref
Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.234
A Reaction
We still seem to have the problem of 'resembling' here, and we certainly have the perennial problem of why any given particular should be placed in any particular set. See Idea 7959.
Related Idea
Idea 7959
How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
The
36 ideas
with the same theme
[the principles and concepts of trope theory]:
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8511
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Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars
[Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
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8508
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A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence
[Williams,DC]
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8509
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A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections
[Williams,DC]
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8510
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'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set
[Williams,DC]
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15483
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Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor
[Martin,CB]
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8537
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Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
[Armstrong]
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18373
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If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
[Armstrong]
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4444
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One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
[Armstrong]
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9657
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You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it
[Lewis]
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15433
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Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
[Lewis]
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8513
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Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue
[Campbell,K]
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8514
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Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars
[Campbell,K]
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8522
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Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars
[Campbell,K]
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8523
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Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect
[Campbell,K]
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8524
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Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size
[Campbell,K]
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11928
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Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism
[Molnar]
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8526
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We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes
[Daly]
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10738
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Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice
[Oliver]
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10739
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The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness
[Oliver]
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10740
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The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes
[Oliver]
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10741
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Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
[Oliver]
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7042
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A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
[Heil]
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10464
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A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality)
[Bacon,John]
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10465
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Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category
[Bacon,John]
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10467
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Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes
[Bacon,John]
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8285
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I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence
[Lowe]
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4234
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Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere
[Lowe]
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4235
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Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness
[Lowe]
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4236
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Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles
[Lowe]
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4461
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Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal
[Moreland]
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18431
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Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes
[Simons, by Edwards]
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14605
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Tropes are the same as events
[Schaffer,J]
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7934
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Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations)
[Macdonald,C]
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7958
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Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars
[Macdonald,C]
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7972
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Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist
[Macdonald,C]
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18864
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The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property
[Tallant]
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