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Single Idea 7962

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals ]

Full Idea

Uninstantiated properties and relations may do some useful philosophical work.

Clarification

'Uninstantiated' means there are no actual cases

Gist of Idea

Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy

Source

Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11), quoted by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.238


A Reaction

Their value isn't just philosophical; hopes and speculations depend on them. This doesn't make universals mind-independent. I think the secret is a clear understanding of the word 'abstract' (which I don't have).


The 29 ideas from Alex Oliver

The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver]
Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]
Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver]
Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]