more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 7968
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
]
Full Idea
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it. (This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the internal relation of lighter to darker. It is unthinkable that these two objects should not stand in this relation).
Clarification
'Eo ipso' (Latin) means by that very fact
Gist of Idea
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it
Source
Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.123)
Book Ref
Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Pears)', ed/tr. Pears,D. /McGuinness,B. [RKP 1961], p.27
A Reaction
An epistemological definition. If only one shade of blue existed, would it still have this internal relation? Are things therefore full of potential internal relations with non-existent things?
The
100 ideas
from 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'
9810
|
The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy
[Badiou on Wittgenstein]
|
18349
|
All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them
[Wittgenstein, by Rami]
|
10967
|
Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth
[Read on Wittgenstein]
|
7087
|
Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects]
[Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
|
4702
|
The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory
[Wittgenstein, by O'Grady]
|
10910
|
The best account of truth-making is isomorphism
[Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
|
6428
|
Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies
[Wittgenstein, by Russell]
|
7537
|
Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms
[Wittgenstein, by Monk]
|
18154
|
The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus'
[Wittgenstein, by Bostock]
|
13429
|
The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning
[Wittgenstein, by Ramsey]
|
13830
|
Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants
[Wittgenstein, by Hacking]
|
9467
|
Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions
[Wittgenstein, by Jacquette]
|
6849
|
Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth
[Wittgenstein, by Monk]
|
7090
|
The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism'
[Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
|
17665
|
The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature
[Wittgenstein, by Armstrong]
|
23507
|
Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them
[Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
|
7088
|
Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities
[Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
|
23479
|
The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths
[Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|
7084
|
What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought
[Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
|
23499
|
This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up
[Wittgenstein]
|
23459
|
This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value
[Wittgenstein]
|
13133
|
The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts
[Wittgenstein]
|
22311
|
The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts
[Wittgenstein]
|
23462
|
He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths
[Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|
11027
|
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences
[Wittgenstein]
|
22321
|
To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties
[Wittgenstein, by Potter]
|
23470
|
Each thing is in a space of possible facts
[Wittgenstein]
|
23465
|
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts
[Wittgenstein]
|
23467
|
Objects are simple
[Wittgenstein]
|
6429
|
All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions
[Wittgenstein]
|
23466
|
Objects are the substance of the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
23469
|
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world
[Wittgenstein]
|
12869
|
Two objects may only differ in being different
[Wittgenstein]
|
23468
|
Apart from the facts, there is only substance
[Wittgenstein]
|
23464
|
In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links
[Wittgenstein]
|
23471
|
The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form
[Wittgenstein]
|
23473
|
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world?
[Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
|
22313
|
The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact
[Wittgenstein]
|
23482
|
The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations
[Wittgenstein]
|
7056
|
Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts
[Wittgenstein]
|
23483
|
Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact
[Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
|
23486
|
Pictures are possible situations in logical space
[Wittgenstein]
|
23485
|
No pictures are true a priori
[Wittgenstein]
|
23487
|
What is thinkable is possible
[Wittgenstein]
|
7089
|
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
[Wittgenstein]
|
23506
|
Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed
[Wittgenstein]
|
2939
|
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim
[Wittgenstein]
|
23492
|
Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque
[Wittgenstein]
|
23510
|
Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language
[Wittgenstein]
|
18268
|
Apparent logical form may not be real logical form
[Wittgenstein]
|
23488
|
Propositions are understood via their constituents
[Wittgenstein]
|
8172
|
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true
[Wittgenstein]
|
23489
|
We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions
[Wittgenstein]
|
23511
|
Propositions use old expressions for a new sense
[Wittgenstein]
|
10905
|
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent
[Wittgenstein]
|
22314
|
On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact
[Wittgenstein]
|
23508
|
Science is all the true propositions
[Wittgenstein]
|
7968
|
A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it
[Wittgenstein]
|
7969
|
The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one
[Wittgenstein]
|
7784
|
'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x
[Wittgenstein]
|
21682
|
If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it
[Wittgenstein]
|
22319
|
Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names
[Wittgenstein]
|
18277
|
If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference
[Wittgenstein]
|
21683
|
Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition
[Wittgenstein]
|
16907
|
If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth
[Wittgenstein]
|
23493
|
'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p
[Wittgenstein]
|
11062
|
Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically
[Wittgenstein]
|
16909
|
Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically
[Wittgenstein]
|
6056
|
Identity is not a relation between objects
[Wittgenstein]
|
22322
|
You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable
[Wittgenstein]
|
6057
|
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept
[Wittgenstein]
|
23498
|
The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible
[Wittgenstein]
|
23475
|
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable
[Wittgenstein]
|
2938
|
The limits of my language means the limits of my world
[Wittgenstein]
|
23502
|
Logic fills the world, to its limits
[Wittgenstein]
|
23497
|
Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language
[Wittgenstein]
|
2940
|
The subject stands outside our understanding of the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
23501
|
There is no a priori order of things
[Wittgenstein]
|
23503
|
Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality
[Wittgenstein]
|
18153
|
A number is a repeated operation
[Wittgenstein]
|
18160
|
The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common
[Wittgenstein]
|
18161
|
The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics
[Wittgenstein]
|
18162
|
The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies
[Wittgenstein]
|
23495
|
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
15089
|
Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies
[Wittgenstein]
|
19292
|
Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status
[Wittgenstein]
|
23509
|
The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics
[Wittgenstein]
|
23504
|
Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident
[Wittgenstein]
|
2941
|
Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences
[Wittgenstein]
|
9442
|
The only necessity is logical necessity
[Wittgenstein]
|
17673
|
The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature
[Wittgenstein]
|
23496
|
Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour
[Wittgenstein]
|
2942
|
The sense of the world must lie outside the world
[Wittgenstein]
|
2943
|
Ethics cannot be put into words
[Wittgenstein]
|
2944
|
If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it
[Wittgenstein]
|
6591
|
Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable
[Wittgenstein]
|
7086
|
Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics
[Wittgenstein]
|
23512
|
Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical
[Wittgenstein]
|
2937
|
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence
[Wittgenstein]
|
6870
|
I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about
[Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein]
|