more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
How could having learned to recognize a good friend help us to recognize a good watch? Yet is Moore is right, the same simple property is present in both cases?
Gist of Idea
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch?
Source
comment on G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.18
Book Ref
MacIntyre,Alasdair: 'A Short History of Ethics' [Routledge 1967], p.252
A Reaction
It begins to look as if what they have in common is just that they both make you feel good. However, I like the Aristotelian idea that they both function succesfully, one as a timekeeper, the other as a citizen or companion.
| 1869 | The good cannot be expressed in words, but imprints itself upon the soul [Plato, by Celsus] |
| 13558 | The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca] |
| 23035 | The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH] |
| 2860 | The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche] |
| 22151 | The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE] |
| 8033 | Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
| 8032 | Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
| 11056 | The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE] |
| 23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
| 23826 | Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil] |
| 23854 | Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil] |