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Single Idea 8032

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics ]

Full Idea

How could having learned to recognize a good friend help us to recognize a good watch? Yet is Moore is right, the same simple property is present in both cases?

Gist of Idea

Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch?

Source

comment on G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.18

Book Ref

MacIntyre,Alasdair: 'A Short History of Ethics' [Routledge 1967], p.252

A Reaction

It begins to look as if what they have in common is just that they both make you feel good. However, I like the Aristotelian idea that they both function succesfully, one as a timekeeper, the other as a citizen or companion.

The 23 ideas from G.E. Moore

21342 A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil]
17992 The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
7527 Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk]
6405 Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling]
22302 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
7526 Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk]
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
6349 I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE]
20147 Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
6672 Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe]