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Single Idea 8061

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings ]

Full Idea

If there is nothing to judgements of virtue and vice except the expression of feelings of approval and disapproval, there can be no criteria external to those feelings by appeal to which we may pass judgement upon them.

Gist of Idea

If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions

Source

Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981], Ch.16)

Book Ref

MacIntyre,Alasdair: 'After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory' [Duckworth 1982], p.214


A Reaction

The idea that there can be right and wrong feelings may be the key idea in virtue theory. See Idea 5217. A good person would be ashamed to have a bad feeling. Some emotional responses are intrinsically wicked, apart from actions.

Related Idea

Idea 5217 At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]


The 27 ideas from 'After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory'

Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman]
We still have the appearance and language of morality, but we no longer understand it [MacIntyre]
Unlike expressions of personal preference, evaluative expressions do not depend on context [MacIntyre]
In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
Since Moore thinks the right action produces the most good, he is a utilitarian [MacIntyre]
Characters are the masks worn by moral philosophies [MacIntyre]
The failure of Enlightenment attempts to justify morality will explain our own culture [MacIntyre]
Philosophy has been marginalised by its failure in the Enlightenment to replace religion [MacIntyre]
Moral judgements now are anachronisms from a theistic age [MacIntyre]
When 'man' is thought of individually, apart from all roles, it ceases to be a functional concept [MacIntyre]
There are no natural or human rights, and belief in them is nonsense [MacIntyre]
Mention of 'intuition' in morality means something has gone wrong with the argument [MacIntyre]
To find empiricism and science in the same culture is surprising, as they are really incompatible [MacIntyre]
Unpredictability doesn't entail inexplicability, and predictability doesn't entail explicability [MacIntyre]
Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre]
Twentieth century social life is re-enacting eighteenth century philosophy [MacIntyre]
AI can't predict innovation, or consequences, or external relations, or external events [MacIntyre]
If God is omniscient, he confronts no as yet unmade decisions, so decisions are impossible [MacIntyre]
Maybe we can only understand rules if we first understand the virtues [MacIntyre]
The good life for man is the life spent seeking the good life for man [MacIntyre]
In the 17th-18th centuries morality offered a cure for egoism, through altruism [MacIntyre]
If morality just is emotion, there are no external criteria for judging emotions [MacIntyre]
Proof is a barren idea in philosophy, and the best philosophy never involves proof [MacIntyre]
I can only make decisions if I see myself as part of a story [MacIntyre]