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Single Idea 8113

[filed under theme 21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language ]

Full Idea

In Goodman's account, knowing what a painting represents is logically like understanding a sentence in a natural language. It requires a grasp of the 'symbol system' to which the painting belongs.

Gist of Idea

Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system

Source

report of Nelson Goodman (The Languages of Art [1976]) by Sebastian Gardner - Aesthetics 2.3.2

Book Ref

'Philosophy: a Guide Through the Subject', ed/tr. Grayling,A.C. [OUP 1995], p.603

A Reaction

This may fit some pictures well (e.g. early Flemish painting, with its complex iconography), but others hardly at all. You can enjoy a first experience of (say) ballet long before you get the hang of the 'symbol system' involved.

The 30 ideas from Nelson Goodman

18749 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
17646 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
14292 Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
4794 We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]
12394 If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
8113 Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner]
20439 Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli]
20438 A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman]
20437 A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman]
20440 Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman]
12191 Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
7956 If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
7957 Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
9920 Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen]
7952 If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
15510 Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman]
10657 The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman]
17649 If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
17650 We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
17651 Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
17654 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
17653 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
17656 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
17657 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
17658 Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
17652 Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
17659 Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
17661 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
17660 Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]