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Single Idea 8127
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
]
Full Idea
Certain thought experiments made trouble for standard functionalism, which limits input/output to the surface of an individual; proposals to extend this into the environment reduces the reliance on a computer paradigm, but increases complexity.
Gist of Idea
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like)
Source
Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.454)
Book Ref
Burge,Tyler: 'Foundations of the Mind' [OUP 2007], p.454
A Reaction
[He has the Twin Earth experiment in mind] The jury is out on this, but it looks a bit of a slippery slope. Accounts of action and responsibility need a fairly sharp concept of an individual. Externalism begins to look like just a new scepticism.
The
14 ideas
from Tyler Burge
9382
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Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications'
[Burge]
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16892
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Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition?
[Burge]
|
16901
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The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning
[Burge]
|
16902
|
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number
[Burge]
|
9159
|
You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost
[Burge]
|
17622
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We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure
[Burge]
|
13479
|
Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it
[Burge]
|
3115
|
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing?
[Burge, by Segal]
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14349
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If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus
[Burge, by Corry]
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8126
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Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states
[Burge]
|
8127
|
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like)
[Burge]
|
8129
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Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge
[Burge]
|
8131
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Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all
[Burge]
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8132
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We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language
[Burge]
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