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Single Idea 8129

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self ]

Full Idea

The idea of anti-individualism raised problems about self-knowledge. The question is whether anti-individualism is compatible with some sort of authoritative or privileged warrant for certain types of self-knowledge.

Gist of Idea

Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge

Source

Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.457)

Book Ref

Burge,Tyler: 'Foundations of the Mind' [OUP 2007], p.457


A Reaction

[See under 'Nature of Minds' for 'Anti-individualism'] The thought is that if your mind is not entirely in your head, you can no longer be an expert on it. It might go the other way: obviously we can be self-experts, so anti-individualism is wrong.


The 14 ideas from Tyler Burge

Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]