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Full Idea
Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.
Gist of Idea
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism')
Source
report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459
Book Ref
Burge,Tyler: 'Foundations of the Mind' [OUP 2007], p.459
A Reaction
Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?
3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |