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Single Idea 8163

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact ]

Full Idea

What complex of objects constitutes the fact that there is no bird on the bough, and how is that distinct from no squirrel on the bough? This drives us to see the world as composed of 'atomic' facts, making complexes into compounds, not reality itself.

Gist of Idea

Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts

Source

Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 1)

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' [OUP 2006], p.7


A Reaction

[He cites early Wittgenstein as an example] But 'no patch of red here' (or sense-datum) seems identical to 'no patch of green here'. I suppose you could catalogue all the atomic facts, and note that red wasn't among them. But you could do that for birds.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [possible different types of fact]:

There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]
Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]