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Single Idea 8166
[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
]
Full Idea
The concept of truth belongs to semantics, since after all truth is what must be preserved by a valid deductive inference.
Gist of Idea
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
Source
Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 2)
Book Ref
Dummett,Michael: 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' [OUP 2006], p.17
A Reaction
Does this conclusion follow? Compare 'nice taste belongs to cooking, since that is what cooking must preserve'. I don't like this. I take 'truth' to be a relevant concept to a discussion of a dog's belief that it is going to be taken for a walk.
The
21 ideas
from 'Thought and Reality'
8163
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Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts
[Dummett]
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8161
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We know we can state facts, with true statements
[Dummett]
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8165
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To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view
[Dummett]
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8166
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Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
[Dummett]
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8167
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If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes
[Dummett]
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8168
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To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning
[Dummett]
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8170
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Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something
[Dummett]
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8169
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We can't distinguish a proposition from its content
[Dummett]
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8175
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A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions
[Dummett]
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8174
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The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought
[Dummett]
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8173
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Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates
[Dummett]
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8176
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We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used
[Dummett]
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8179
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The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence
[Dummett]
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8180
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'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not
[Dummett]
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8178
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Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale
[Dummett]
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8181
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A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic
[Dummett]
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8182
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Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power
[Dummett]
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8183
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If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change
[Dummett]
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8184
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Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it
[Dummett]
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8185
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We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind
[Dummett]
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8186
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Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change
[Dummett]
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