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Single Idea 8167

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism ]

Full Idea

If Presentism is correct - the doctrine that there is nothing at all, save what holds good at the present moment - then we cannot even say that the present changes, because that requires that things are not now as they were some time ago.

Gist of Idea

If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes

Source

Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 2)

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' [OUP 2006], p.18


A Reaction

Presumably we can compare our present memory with our present experience. See Idea 6668. The logic (very ancient!) is that the present has not duration at all, and so no experiences can occur during it.

Related Idea

Idea 6668 If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall]


The 21 ideas from 'Thought and Reality'

Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett]
To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett]
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett]
If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett]
To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett]
The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett]
Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett]
We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett]
The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett]
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett]
Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett]
A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett]
We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett]
Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett]