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Single Idea 8181

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification ]

Full Idea

If we adopt a justificationist theory of meaning, we must reject the universal law of excluded middle, and with it classical logic (which rests on the two-valued semantics of bivalence). We admit only intuitionist logic, which preserves justifiability.

Clarification

'Justificationist' is Dummett's renaming of the older 'verificationist' theory

Gist of Idea

A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic

Source

Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 5)

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' [OUP 2006], p.64

A Reaction

This is Dummett's philosophy in a very neat nutshell. He seems to have started by accepting Brouwer's intuitionism, and then working back to language. It all implies anti-realism. I don't buy it.

The 36 ideas with the same theme [meaning is tied to observation and verification]:

14906 Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]
6427 Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
13468 Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD]
5388 Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell]
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
18728 The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
4150 Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein]
18282 You can't believe it if you can't imagine a verification for it [Wittgenstein]
7086 Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein]
5164 A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
5165 Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
5166 The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
5181 A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer]
5184 Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer]
5186 Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer]
8181 A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
8182 Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
8183 If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
8193 Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett]
4565 The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
4564 I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
2744 Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J]
2760 Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J]
13410 Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]
3007 Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
7883 Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau]
13882 A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
4999 For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
2971 Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood]
3181 A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey]
10060 Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave]
7766 Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan]
4710 Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady]
9134 The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
5748 We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
17731 Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]