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Single Idea 8181

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification ]

Full Idea

If we adopt a justificationist theory of meaning, we must reject the universal law of excluded middle, and with it classical logic (which rests on the two-valued semantics of bivalence). We admit only intuitionist logic, which preserves justifiability.

Clarification

'Justificationist' is Dummett's renaming of the older 'verificationist' theory

Gist of Idea

A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic

Source

Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 5)

Book Ref

Dummett,Michael: 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' [OUP 2006], p.64

A Reaction

This is Dummett's philosophy in a very neat nutshell. He seems to have started by accepting Brouwer's intuitionism, and then working back to language. It all implies anti-realism. I don't buy it.

The 21 ideas from 'Thought and Reality'

8163 Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
8161 We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett]
8165 To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett]
8166 Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett]
8167 If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett]
8168 To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
8170 Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
8169 We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett]
8175 A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett]
8174 The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett]
8173 Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett]
8176 We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett]
8179 The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett]
8180 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett]
8178 Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett]
8181 A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett]
8182 Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett]
8183 If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett]
8184 Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett]
8185 We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett]
8186 Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett]