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Single Idea 8181
[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
]
Full Idea
If we adopt a justificationist theory of meaning, we must reject the universal law of excluded middle, and with it classical logic (which rests on the two-valued semantics of bivalence). We admit only intuitionist logic, which preserves justifiability.
Clarification
'Justificationist' is Dummett's renaming of the older 'verificationist' theory
Gist of Idea
A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic
Source
Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 5)
Book Ref
Dummett,Michael: 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' [OUP 2006], p.64
A Reaction
This is Dummett's philosophy in a very neat nutshell. He seems to have started by accepting Brouwer's intuitionism, and then working back to language. It all implies anti-realism. I don't buy it.
The
21 ideas
from 'Thought and Reality'
8163
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Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts
[Dummett]
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8161
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We know we can state facts, with true statements
[Dummett]
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8165
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To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view
[Dummett]
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8166
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Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth
[Dummett]
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8167
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If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes
[Dummett]
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8168
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To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning
[Dummett]
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8170
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Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something
[Dummett]
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8169
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We can't distinguish a proposition from its content
[Dummett]
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8174
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The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought
[Dummett]
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8175
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A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions
[Dummett]
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8173
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Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates
[Dummett]
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8176
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We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used
[Dummett]
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8179
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The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence
[Dummett]
|
8180
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'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not
[Dummett]
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8178
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Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale
[Dummett]
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8181
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A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic
[Dummett]
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8182
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Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power
[Dummett]
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8183
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If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change
[Dummett]
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8184
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Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it
[Dummett]
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8185
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We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind
[Dummett]
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8186
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Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change
[Dummett]
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