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Full Idea
It is not enough for the truth-condition theorist to argue that we need the concept of truth: he must show that we should have the same conception of truth that he has.
Gist of Idea
The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth
Source
Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 2)
Book Ref
Dummett,Michael: 'Truth and the Past (Dewey Lectures)' [Columbia 2004], p.35
A Reaction
Davidson invites us to accept Tarski's account of truth. It invites the question of what the theory would be like with a very robust correspondence account of truth, or a flabby rather subjective coherence view, or the worst sort of pragmatic view.
| 8189 | Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth [Dummett] |
| 8191 | The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth [Dummett] |
| 8190 | Intuitionists rely on the proof of mathematical statements, not their truth [Dummett] |
| 8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
| 8193 | Verification is not an individual but a collective activity [Dummett] |
| 8195 | Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett] |
| 8194 | Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett] |
| 8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
| 8197 | Maybe past (which affects us) and future (which we can affect) are both real [Dummett] |
| 8196 | The present cannot exist alone as a mere boundary; past and future truths are rendered meaningless [Dummett] |
| 8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |