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Single Idea 8244

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data ]

Full Idea

Rather than oppose sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge, we should identify the sensibilia that are peculiar to science. This is what Russell did when he evoked sense-data, qualities devoid of all subjectivity.

Gist of Idea

Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics [1914]) by G Deleuze / F Guattari - What is Philosophy? 2.5

Book Ref

Deleuze/Guattari: 'What is Philosophy?' [Verso 1994], p.131


A Reaction

An interesting observation. Russell is striking for his lack of interest in theories of arts and ethics, and his whole work focuses on understanding the scientific view. What is involved in sensibilia is a key modern issue (e.g. McDowell).


The 18 ideas from 'The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics'

Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari]
We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell]
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell]
Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell]
Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell]
Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell]
Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell]
Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell]
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell]
There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell]