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Full Idea
Nothing purely within the theory of meaning is capable of telling us which of two sentences which are paraphrases of one another more accurately reflects the ontological commitments of those who utter them.
Gist of Idea
How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea?
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 2.3)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.35
A Reaction
This is an attack on the semantic approach to ontology, associated with Quine. Cf. Idea 7923. I have always had an aversion to that approach, and received opinion is beginning to agree. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio..."
Related Idea
Idea 7923 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
21699 | Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine] |
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |