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Single Idea 8283
[filed under theme 7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
]
Full Idea
Ontological categories should not be confused with natural kinds: for natural kinds can only be differentiated in a principled way relative to an accepted framework of ontological categories.
Gist of Idea
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.179
A Reaction
I presume that the natural kinds are likely to be contingent facts about the actual world (though they may entail necessary laws), whereas I like to think, unfashionably, that categories aim at deconstructing the mind of God (roughly).
The
67 ideas
from 'The Possibility of Metaphysics'
16063
|
Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed'
[Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
|
16414
|
Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions
[Lowe, by Hofweber]
|
8258
|
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs
[Lowe]
|
9414
|
Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities
[Lowe, by Mumford]
|
8260
|
Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds)
[Lowe]
|
8267
|
Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality
[Lowe]
|
8265
|
Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value
[Lowe]
|
8263
|
An object is an entity which has identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
8262
|
How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea?
[Lowe]
|
8266
|
Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous
[Lowe]
|
8268
|
Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity
[Lowe]
|
8269
|
Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them
[Lowe]
|
8270
|
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects
[Lowe]
|
8271
|
An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times
[Lowe]
|
8272
|
How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes?
[Lowe]
|
8273
|
Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental?
[Lowe]
|
8275
|
Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects
[Lowe]
|
8276
|
Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual
[Lowe]
|
8279
|
The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin?
[Lowe]
|
8280
|
While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change
[Lowe]
|
8282
|
Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change
[Lowe]
|
8283
|
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former
[Lowe]
|
8281
|
Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance
[Lowe]
|
8284
|
The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent
[Lowe]
|
8285
|
I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence
[Lowe]
|
8286
|
Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects
[Lowe]
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8288
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Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not
[Lowe]
|
8290
|
One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter
[Lowe]
|
8292
|
Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence
[Lowe]
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8291
|
Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind
[Lowe]
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8289
|
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted
[Lowe]
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8293
|
Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature
[Lowe]
|
8294
|
How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes?
[Lowe]
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8295
|
Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle?
[Lowe]
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8296
|
Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide?
[Lowe]
|
16130
|
To be an object at all requires identity-conditions
[Lowe]
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16128
|
A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects
[Lowe]
|
16131
|
The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit
[Lowe]
|
16127
|
Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is
[Lowe]
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15079
|
'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws
[Lowe]
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8297
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Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality
[Lowe]
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8298
|
Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa
[Lowe]
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8299
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Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts
[Lowe]
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8300
|
Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void)
[Lowe]
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8301
|
Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them
[Lowe]
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8302
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Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another
[Lowe]
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8305
|
A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it
[Lowe]
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8303
|
Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types
[Lowe]
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8306
|
You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable
[Lowe]
|
8307
|
Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables
[Lowe]
|
8308
|
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations
[Lowe]
|
8310
|
Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do?
[Lowe]
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8309
|
A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members
[Lowe]
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8311
|
If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2
[Lowe]
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8313
|
Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria
[Lowe]
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8312
|
It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation
[Lowe]
|
8315
|
Maybe facts are just true propositions
[Lowe]
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8314
|
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents?
[Lowe]
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8316
|
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations
[Lowe]
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8317
|
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects
[Lowe]
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8318
|
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents
[Lowe]
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8319
|
One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items
[Lowe]
|
8320
|
Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world?
[Lowe]
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8321
|
All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects
[Lowe]
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8322
|
I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
8323
|
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast?
[Lowe]
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13122
|
Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete
[Lowe, by Westerhoff]
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