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Single Idea 8289
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
]
Full Idea
The vulgar notion, propagated by some modern physicalist philosophers, that Cartesian souls are supposed to be made of some sort of ghostly, 'immaterial' stuff - a near contradiction in terms - is quite unwarranted.
Gist of Idea
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.200
A Reaction
A nice illustration of the service which can be offered by this database. See Idea 3423 for an illustration of the sort of thing which Lowe is attacking. See Idea 5011 for a quotation from Descartes on the subject. I leave the decision with my visitor...
Related Ideas
Idea 3423
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
Idea 5011
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[mind and matter are two quite different substances]:
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3519
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Man uses his body, so must be separate from it
[Anon (Plat), by Maslin]
|
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1710
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Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them
[Aristotle]
|
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13307
|
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul
[Seneca]
|
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21809
|
Our soul has the same ideal nature as the oldest god, and is honourable above the body
[Plotinus]
|
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21825
|
The soul is outside of all of space, and has no connection to the bodily order
[Plotinus]
|
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18458
|
The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition
[Porphyry]
|
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22105
|
The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle
[Aquinas]
|
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24028
|
The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body
[Descartes]
|
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3608
|
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence
[Descartes]
|
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3613
|
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs
[Descartes]
|
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2276
|
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks
[Descartes]
|
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2298
|
Mind is not extended, unlike the body
[Descartes]
|
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3423
|
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist
[Descartes, by Kim]
|
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2303
|
The mind is utterly indivisible
[Descartes]
|
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5011
|
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance
[Descartes]
|
|
19409
|
Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes
[Leibniz]
|
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5585
|
Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance
[Kant]
|
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22039
|
Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity
[Hegel, by Pinkard]
|
|
14802
|
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction
[Peirce]
|
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2620
|
Dualism is a category mistake
[Ryle]
|
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4069
|
Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
[Crane]
|
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8289
|
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted
[Lowe]
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