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Single Idea 8305
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
]
Full Idea
As Locke clearly understood, one must first have a clear conception of what kind of object one is dealing with in order to extract a criterion of identity for objects of that kind from that conception.
Gist of Idea
A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.3)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.215
A Reaction
Archaeologist face objects which they can number, remember and take pride in, without having a clue what kind of thing they are dealing with. The two processes may not be entirely distinct.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[identity can only ever be in respect of some feature]:
16794
|
As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being
[Hobbes]
|
16795
|
Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas
[Locke]
|
12153
|
Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F
[Perry on Frege]
|
17653
|
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness
[Goodman]
|
16075
|
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory
[Wasserman on Geach]
|
12152
|
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as'
[Geach]
|
17512
|
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?
[Ayers]
|
13953
|
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind
[Cartwright,R]
|
12155
|
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance
[Perry]
|
14362
|
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
11838
|
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category
[Wiggins]
|
11847
|
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
[Wiggins]
|
14755
|
Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity
[Gallois, by Sider]
|
8305
|
A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it
[Lowe]
|
10321
|
We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion
[Hale]
|
15185
|
We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it
[Sidelle]
|
4640
|
If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y')
[Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
|
16074
|
Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity'
[Wasserman]
|