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Single Idea 8308

[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive ]

Full Idea

We must include events in our ontology because they figure indispensably in singular causal explanations.

Clarification

'Singular causation' is when the event is not repeated

Gist of Idea

Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.5)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.220


A Reaction

Hm. Spirits figure indispensably in supernatural explanations. It would be quite a task to prove that events really are indispensable to causal explanations. Why would nomological or counterfactual causal explanations not have the same need?


The 11 ideas with the same theme [treating happenings as basic ingredients of existence]:

In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden]
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons]
Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]