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Full Idea
If facts are 'proposition-like' or 'thinkable' (we speak of 'knowing' or 'understanding' facts) might they not simply be true propositions?
Gist of Idea
Maybe facts are just true propositions
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.234
A Reaction
They certainly can't be if we are going to use facts as what makes propositions true. The proposal would be empty without out some other account of truth (probably a dubious one). Facts are truth-makers?
Related Idea
Idea 14778 Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
| 20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
| 10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
| 13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
| 10355 | Facts can't make claims true, because they are true claims [Brandom, by Kusch] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
| 18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
| 17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |