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Single Idea 8318

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts ]

Full Idea

The most notorious problem besetting the view that facts are structured complexes of constituents is the question of what it is that binds the supposed constituents into the fact. The ordered triple doesn't make Mars red.

Gist of Idea

The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.5)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.243


A Reaction

Lowe denies that facts are complex entities on this basis. You only have the problem if Mars and its redness are two 'things'. If redness is intrinsically a dependent item, we may escape. I wish they wouldn't use colours as examples. See Idea 5456.

Related Idea

Idea 5456 Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]


The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about facts]:

Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane]
Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady]
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]