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Single Idea 8323
[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
]
Full Idea
Although 'fact' is grammatically a count noun, it strikes us as being at best whimsical to talk about enumerating facts - to talk, for instance, about how many facts I learned today before breakfast.
Gist of Idea
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast?
Source
E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.4)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.258
A Reaction
I always liked the question 'how many facts are there in this room?' One might make a serious attempt to decide how many facts I learned before breakfast, and reach a reasonable approximation, especially if one didn't open the newspaper.
The
198 ideas
from E.J. Lowe
18351
|
Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth
[Lowe]
|
18352
|
Tropes have existence independently of any entities
[Lowe]
|
18353
|
Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals
[Lowe]
|
8967
|
Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example
[Lowe]
|
8968
|
If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole
[Lowe]
|
8965
|
Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination
[Lowe]
|
8966
|
Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction
[Lowe]
|
15541
|
Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement
[Lowe, by Lewis]
|
7710
|
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation
[Lowe]
|
7711
|
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object
[Lowe]
|
7712
|
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities
[Lowe]
|
7714
|
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic)
[Lowe]
|
7715
|
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication
[Lowe]
|
7720
|
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal
[Lowe]
|
7722
|
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat"
[Lowe]
|
16414
|
Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions
[Lowe, by Hofweber]
|
16063
|
Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed'
[Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
|
8258
|
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs
[Lowe]
|
9414
|
Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities
[Lowe, by Mumford]
|
8260
|
Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds)
[Lowe]
|
8267
|
Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality
[Lowe]
|
8265
|
Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value
[Lowe]
|
8263
|
An object is an entity which has identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
8262
|
How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea?
[Lowe]
|
8266
|
Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous
[Lowe]
|
8268
|
Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity
[Lowe]
|
8269
|
Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them
[Lowe]
|
8270
|
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects
[Lowe]
|
8271
|
An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times
[Lowe]
|
8272
|
How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes?
[Lowe]
|
8273
|
Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental?
[Lowe]
|
8275
|
Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects
[Lowe]
|
8276
|
Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual
[Lowe]
|
8279
|
The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin?
[Lowe]
|
8280
|
While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change
[Lowe]
|
8283
|
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former
[Lowe]
|
8281
|
Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance
[Lowe]
|
8282
|
Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change
[Lowe]
|
8285
|
I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence
[Lowe]
|
8286
|
Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects
[Lowe]
|
8284
|
The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent
[Lowe]
|
8288
|
Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not
[Lowe]
|
8292
|
Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence
[Lowe]
|
8291
|
Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind
[Lowe]
|
8289
|
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted
[Lowe]
|
8290
|
One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter
[Lowe]
|
8293
|
Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature
[Lowe]
|
8294
|
How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes?
[Lowe]
|
8295
|
Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle?
[Lowe]
|
8296
|
Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide?
[Lowe]
|
16130
|
To be an object at all requires identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
16128
|
A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects
[Lowe]
|
16131
|
The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit
[Lowe]
|
16127
|
Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is
[Lowe]
|
15079
|
'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws
[Lowe]
|
8297
|
Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality
[Lowe]
|
8298
|
Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa
[Lowe]
|
8299
|
Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts
[Lowe]
|
8300
|
Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void)
[Lowe]
|
8301
|
Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them
[Lowe]
|
8302
|
Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another
[Lowe]
|
8303
|
Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types
[Lowe]
|
8305
|
A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it
[Lowe]
|
8306
|
You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable
[Lowe]
|
8307
|
Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables
[Lowe]
|
8308
|
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations
[Lowe]
|
8310
|
Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do?
[Lowe]
|
8309
|
A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members
[Lowe]
|
8311
|
If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2
[Lowe]
|
8313
|
Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria
[Lowe]
|
8312
|
It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation
[Lowe]
|
8315
|
Maybe facts are just true propositions
[Lowe]
|
8314
|
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents?
[Lowe]
|
8316
|
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations
[Lowe]
|
8317
|
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects
[Lowe]
|
8318
|
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents
[Lowe]
|
8319
|
One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items
[Lowe]
|
8320
|
Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world?
[Lowe]
|
8321
|
All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects
[Lowe]
|
8322
|
I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
8323
|
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast?
[Lowe]
|
13122
|
Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete
[Lowe, by Westerhoff]
|
6617
|
The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties?
[Lowe]
|
6631
|
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?
[Lowe]
|
6619
|
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining'
[Lowe]
|
6618
|
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change
[Lowe]
|
6626
|
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires
[Lowe]
|
6625
|
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
[Lowe]
|
6623
|
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
|
6629
|
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
|
6628
|
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
|
6621
|
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief
[Lowe]
|
6622
|
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
|
6630
|
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
[Lowe]
|
6634
|
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)
[Lowe]
|
6635
|
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future
[Lowe]
|
6632
|
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief
[Lowe]
|
6636
|
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
[Lowe]
|
6633
|
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical
[Lowe]
|
6637
|
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially?
[Lowe]
|
6645
|
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong
[Lowe]
|
6639
|
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common
[Lowe]
|
6640
|
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external
[Lowe]
|
6642
|
Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations
[Lowe]
|
6646
|
The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight
[Lowe]
|
6643
|
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality
[Lowe]
|
6638
|
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form
[Lowe]
|
6644
|
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information
[Lowe]
|
6641
|
Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity
[Lowe]
|
6647
|
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation
[Lowe]
|
6648
|
Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech
[Lowe]
|
6652
|
'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background
[Lowe]
|
6651
|
People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event
[Lowe]
|
6655
|
The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge
[Lowe]
|
6654
|
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual
[Lowe]
|
6656
|
The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods
[Lowe]
|
6653
|
Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth
[Lowe]
|
6659
|
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent
[Lowe]
|
6661
|
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation
[Lowe]
|
6662
|
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice
[Lowe]
|
6663
|
People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes
[Lowe]
|
6657
|
Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity
[Lowe]
|
6666
|
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I'
[Lowe]
|
6665
|
Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge
[Lowe]
|
6670
|
If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body
[Lowe]
|
6671
|
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation
[Lowe]
|
6667
|
There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory
[Lowe]
|
16532
|
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty'
[Lowe]
|
16533
|
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities
[Lowe]
|
16531
|
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity
[Lowe]
|
16534
|
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously
[Lowe]
|
16535
|
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist
[Lowe]
|
16547
|
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine
[Lowe]
|
16539
|
A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle
[Lowe]
|
16540
|
Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse
[Lowe]
|
16548
|
An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right
[Lowe]
|
16549
|
Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions
[Lowe]
|
16542
|
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted
[Lowe]
|
16538
|
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences
[Lowe]
|
16543
|
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary
[Lowe]
|
16544
|
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths
[Lowe]
|
16545
|
The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct
[Lowe]
|
16546
|
The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze
[Lowe]
|
16551
|
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition
[Lowe]
|
16552
|
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that
[Lowe]
|
16550
|
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about
[Lowe]
|
14581
|
The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members
[Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
|
4205
|
'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction)
[Lowe]
|
4195
|
It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility
[Lowe]
|
4206
|
Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump?
[Lowe]
|
4207
|
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds
[Lowe]
|
4197
|
The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations
[Lowe]
|
4196
|
The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete
[Lowe]
|
4208
|
'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual
[Lowe]
|
4209
|
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration
[Lowe]
|
4210
|
If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition
[Lowe]
|
4211
|
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case
[Lowe]
|
4212
|
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity
[Lowe]
|
4213
|
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities)
[Lowe]
|
4214
|
Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible
[Lowe]
|
4194
|
Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole
[Lowe]
|
4193
|
The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation
[Lowe]
|
4215
|
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers
[Lowe]
|
4217
|
It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology
[Lowe]
|
4219
|
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time
[Lowe]
|
4220
|
Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time
[Lowe]
|
4221
|
Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology
[Lowe]
|
4222
|
If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring?
[Lowe]
|
4223
|
Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics
[Lowe]
|
4224
|
If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects
[Lowe]
|
4225
|
Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things
[Lowe]
|
4227
|
Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract
[Lowe]
|
4198
|
If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship
[Lowe]
|
4228
|
If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects?
[Lowe]
|
4199
|
A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist
[Lowe]
|
4229
|
An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member
[Lowe]
|
4200
|
If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship).
[Lowe]
|
4232
|
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist
[Lowe]
|
4233
|
If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set
[Lowe]
|
4234
|
Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere
[Lowe]
|
4235
|
Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness
[Lowe]
|
4236
|
Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles
[Lowe]
|
4238
|
The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location
[Lowe]
|
4237
|
Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations
[Lowe]
|
4239
|
Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence
[Lowe]
|
4241
|
If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects
[Lowe]
|
4240
|
It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth
[Lowe]
|
4201
|
Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F'
[Lowe, by PG]
|
4202
|
Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance
[Lowe]
|
4203
|
Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties)
[Lowe]
|
4204
|
Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material
[Lowe]
|
7783
|
Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist
[Lowe]
|
13917
|
Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency
[Lowe]
|
13919
|
Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things
[Lowe]
|
13918
|
Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical
[Lowe]
|
13921
|
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them
[Lowe]
|
13922
|
Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing
[Lowe]
|
13920
|
Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category
[Lowe]
|