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Full Idea
An early view of causation (Mill and Hume) is whatever is (ceteris paribus) sufficient for the event. A second view (E.Nagel) is that the cause should just be necessary. Some (R.Taylor) even contemplate the cause having to be necessary and sufficient.
Clarification
'Ceteris paribus' (L) means 'all things being equal'
Gist of Idea
Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both?
Source
E Sosa / M Tooley (Introduction to 'Causation' [1993], §2)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.6
A Reaction
A cause can't be necessary if there is some other way to achieve the effect. A single cause is not sufficient if many other factors are also essential. If neither of those is right, then 'both' is wrong. Enter John Mackie...
8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |
8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |