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Single Idea 8333

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause ]

Full Idea

If a short-circuit causes a fire, the so-called cause is, and is known to be, an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result. Let us call this an INUS condition.

Gist of Idea

A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition

Source

J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §1)

Book Ref

'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.34


A Reaction

I'm not clear why it is necessary, given that the fire could have started without the short-circuit. The final situation must certainly be sufficient. If only one situation can cause an effect, then the whole situation is necessary.

Related Idea

Idea 17254 An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes]


The 14 ideas with the same theme [naming 'the' cause among the pre-condtions of events]:

Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]