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Full Idea
A necessary causal condition is closely related to a counterfactual conditional: if no-cause then no-effect, and a sufficient causal condition is closely related to a factual conditional (Goodman's phrase): since cause-here then effect.
Gist of Idea
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals
Source
J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §4)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.48
A Reaction
The 'factual conditional' just seems to be an assertion that causation occurred (dressed up with the logical-sounding 'since'). An important distinction for Lewis. Sufficiency doesn't seem to need possible-worlds talk.
| 8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
| 8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
| 8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
| 8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
| 8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
| 8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |
| 8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
| 8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
| 8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |