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Single Idea 8337

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation ]

Full Idea

It is sometimes suggested that our ability to recognise a single occurrence as an instance of mental causation is a feature which distinguishes mental causation from physical or 'Humean' causation.

Clarification

'Humean' causation needs regularities

Gist of Idea

Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences

Source

J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §9)

Book Ref

'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.54


A Reaction

Hume says regularities are needed for mental causation too. Concentrate hard on causing a lightning flash - 'did I do that?' Gradually recovering from paralysis; you wouldn't just move your leg once, and know it was all right!


The 11 ideas with the same theme [extent of the observability of a cause]:

We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche]
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim]
Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden]
Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil]
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J]
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J]