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Single Idea 8346

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation ]

Full Idea

The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).

Gist of Idea

Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity

Source

Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)

Book Ref

Davidson,Donald: 'Essays on Actions and Events' [OUP 1982], p.157

A Reaction

If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?

The 19 ideas with the same theme [analysis of situation that leads to an event]:

588 We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
1895 Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus]
2272 There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
17254 An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes]
8382 For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane]
8345 A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill]
8369 Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
8373 When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
8360 We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
8350 Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]
8343 Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
8385 A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
8335 Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
8336 The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
8346 Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
15217 Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
8330 Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
8407 A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
4211 Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]