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Full Idea
The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).
Gist of Idea
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity
Source
Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)
Book Ref
Davidson,Donald: 'Essays on Actions and Events' [OUP 1982], p.157
A Reaction
If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |