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Single Idea 8354

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions ]

Full Idea

The way in which Russell arrived at his analysis was by asking himself what would be the circumstances in which we would say that anyone who uttered the sentence 'The King of France is wise' had made a true assertion.

Gist of Idea

Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion

Source

Peter F. Strawson (On Referring [1950], §1)

Book Ref

'The Theory of Meaning', ed/tr. Parkinson,G.H.R. [OUP 1978], p.65


A Reaction

This seems to connect Russell's theory of definite descriptions with the truth conditions theory of meaning which is associated (initially) with Frege. Truth will require some reference to what actually exists.


The 8 ideas from 'On Referring'

Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury]
If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling]
Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P]
The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P]
Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P]
If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P]
There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P]