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Single Idea 8360
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
]
Full Idea
We may be able to analyse causation into conditionship relations between events or states of affairs, ...but conditions cannot be regarded as logical primitives, ... and must be analysed into quantifiers, or modal concepts.
Gist of Idea
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts
Source
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §2)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.106
A Reaction
[very compressed] A nice illustration of the aim of analytical philosophy - to analyse the elements of reality down to logical primitives. This is the dream of Descartes and Leibniz, continued by Russell and co. Do we still have this aspiration?
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[analysis of situation that leads to an event]:
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588
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We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise
[Aristotle]
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1895
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Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly
[Sext.Empiricus]
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2272
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There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect
[Descartes]
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17254
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An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause
[Hobbes]
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8382
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For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation
[Hume, by Crane]
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8345
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A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result
[Mill]
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8369
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Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon
[Ducasse]
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8373
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When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage
[Ducasse]
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8360
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We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts
[Wright,GHv]
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8350
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Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions
[Anscombe]
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8343
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Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events
[Kim on Mackie]
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8385
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A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect
[Mackie, by Crane]
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8335
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Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals
[Mackie]
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8336
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The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known
[Mackie]
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8346
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Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity
[Davidson]
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15217
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Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity
[Harré/Madden]
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8330
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Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both?
[Sosa/Tooley]
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8407
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A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it
[Sanford]
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4211
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Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case
[Lowe]
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