more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
There is an implicit dependence of the very notion of a cause on a concept of agency and action.
Gist of Idea
The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action
Source
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §10)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.123
A Reaction
This is because he thinks experimental intervention is the key to the concept of causation (see Ideas 8362 and 8363). Others go further, and say that the concept of causation arises from subjective experience of performing actions. I quite like that.
Related Ideas
Idea 8362 We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
Idea 8363 p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
| 4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| 8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
| 8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
| 8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
| 3535 | All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim] |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
| 10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |