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Full Idea
There is an implicit dependence of the very notion of a cause on a concept of agency and action.
Gist of Idea
The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action
Source
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §10)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.123
A Reaction
This is because he thinks experimental intervention is the key to the concept of causation (see Ideas 8362 and 8363). Others go further, and say that the concept of causation arises from subjective experience of performing actions. I quite like that.
Related Ideas
Idea 8362 We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
Idea 8363 p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
| 8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
| 8360 | We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv] |
| 8361 | What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv] |
| 8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
| 8363 | p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv] |
| 8364 | We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv] |
| 8365 | Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv] |