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Full Idea
There are four causal connections: an event is sufficient for another if it is its cause; an event is necessary for another if it is a condition for it; it is necessitated by another if it is an effect; it is contingent upon another if it is a resultant.
Gist of Idea
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon
Source
Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §2)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.126
A Reaction
An event could be a condition for another without being necessary. He seems to have missed the indispensable aspect of a necessary condition.
| 8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
| 8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
| 8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
| 8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
| 8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
| 8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| 8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |