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Full Idea
The part of a generalization concerning what is common to one individual concrete event and the causes of certain other events of the same kind is involved in the mere assigning of a name to the cause and its effect, but not in the perceiving them.
Gist of Idea
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them
Source
Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §5)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.134
A Reaction
A nice point, that we should keep distinct the recognition of a cause, and the assigning of a general name to it. Ducasse is claiming that we can directly perceive singular causation.
| 4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| 8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
| 8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
| 8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
| 3535 | All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim] |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
| 10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
| 10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |