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Single Idea 8382

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation ]

Full Idea

Hume held that constant conjunction between As and Bs is both necessary and sufficient for a causal relation. If As and Bs are conjoined that is sufficient for a causal relation; if A and B are causally related, necessarily they are constantly conjoined.

Gist of Idea

For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation

Source

report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Tim Crane - Causation 1.2.2

Book Ref

'Philosophy: a Guide Through the Subject', ed/tr. Grayling,A.C. [OUP 1995], p.186


A Reaction

A helpful connection between Hume and the modern debate about conditions for causation (e.g. Mackie). It sounds as if, to spot the necessary condition, you need to independently see that A and B are causally related, which regularity does not allow.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [analysis of situation that leads to an event]:

We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise [Aristotle]
Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus]
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes]
For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane]
A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill]
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley]
A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]