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Single Idea 8395

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation ]

Full Idea

For general causal statements Mackie favours a nomological account, but for singular causal statements he argued for an analysis in terms of subjunctive conditionals.

Gist of Idea

Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones

Source

report of J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.2

Book Ref

'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.407


A Reaction

These seem to be consistent, by explaining each by placing it within a broader account of reality. Personally I think Ducasse gives the best account of how you get from the particular to the general (via similarity and utility).


The 22 ideas with the same theme [causes as aspects of lawlike behaviour]:

Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard]
We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares]
Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant]
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood]
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil]
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird]