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Full Idea
It is best to avoid Davidson's view that only quite concrete events can serve as causes; we should either say that facts as well as events can serve as causes; or that the events can be highly unspecific, including 'omissions'.
Gist of Idea
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events
Source
comment on Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World 1
Book Ref
'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.440
A Reaction
Something NOT happening might be the main cause of an effect (drought), or an effect may mainly result from a situation rather than an event (famine).
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |