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Single Idea 8404
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
]
Full Idea
Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
Gist of Idea
Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected
Source
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
Book Ref
'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.443
A Reaction
I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.
The
44 ideas
from Hartry Field
9160
|
Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible
[Field,H]
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9161
|
Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view
[Field,H]
|
9162
|
Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
[Field,H]
|
9163
|
If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori
[Field,H]
|
9164
|
We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence
[Field,H]
|
9166
|
People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct'
[Field,H]
|
9165
|
Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes
[Field,H]
|
8401
|
Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation
[Field,H]
|
8400
|
Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones
[Field,H]
|
8402
|
The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality
[Field,H]
|
8404
|
Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected
[Field,H]
|
9226
|
If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter
[Field,H]
|
8714
|
Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true
[Field,H]
|
8959
|
Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science
[Field,H, by Szabó]
|
8958
|
In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers
[Field,H, by Szabó]
|
10261
|
The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth
[Field,H, by Shapiro]
|
9570
|
In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things
[Field,H, by Chihara]
|
10260
|
Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q
[Field,H, by Shapiro]
|
18212
|
Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions
[Field,H]
|
18213
|
Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical
[Field,H]
|
18215
|
It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises
[Field,H]
|
18214
|
Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful
[Field,H]
|
18216
|
Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements
[Field,H]
|
18218
|
Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space
[Field,H]
|
18219
|
Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously
[Field,H]
|
18220
|
Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive
[Field,H]
|
18222
|
Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation
[Field,H]
|
18221
|
'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space
[Field,H]
|
9623
|
Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets
[Brown,JR on Field,H]
|
18223
|
In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents
[Field,H]
|
9917
|
'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract
[Field,H]
|
8757
|
The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities
[Field,H]
|
18211
|
You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic
[Field,H]
|
18210
|
Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions?
[Field,H]
|
13499
|
Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation
[Field,H, by Hart,WD]
|
10818
|
Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions
[Field,H]
|
7615
|
Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects
[Field,H, by Putnam]
|
10817
|
Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions
[Field,H]
|
10819
|
Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model
[Field,H]
|
10820
|
In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific
[Field,H]
|
10825
|
The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others
[Field,H]
|
10826
|
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism
[Field,H]
|
10827
|
Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers
[Field,H]
|
22244
|
'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object
[Field,H, by Recanati]
|