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Full Idea
The basic idea of probabilistic causation is that a sufficient condition of C's being a cause of E is that C and E are actual, individual events, and the objective chance of E's occurring is greater given the occurrence of C than it would be without C.
Gist of Idea
Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring
Source
report of D.H. Mellor (The Facts of Causation [1995]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.3
Book Ref
'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.412
A Reaction
Mellor has to include objective 'chances' in his ontology to support his theory. As it stands this looks like a weak theory, since the event might not occur despite C happening, and some less likely event might turn out to be the actual cause.
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |