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Full Idea
I identify a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true.
Gist of Idea
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true
Source
David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.193
A Reaction
As it stands, I'm baffled by this. How can 'it is raining' be a set of possible worlds? I assume it expands to refer to the truth-conditions, among possibilities as well as actualities. 'It is raining' fits all worlds where it is raining.
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
| 15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
| 15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
| 18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |