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Single Idea 8423

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation ]

Full Idea

My (counterfactual) analysis is meant to apply to causation in particular cases; it is not an analysis of causal generalizations. Those presumably quantify over particulars, but it is hard to match natural language to the quantifiers.

Gist of Idea

My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations

Source

David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.195)

Book Ref

'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.195

A Reaction

What authority could you have for asserting a counterfactual claim, if you only had one observation? Isn't the counterfactual claim the hallmark of a generalisation? For one case, 'if not-c, then not-e' is just a speculation.

The 37 ideas with the same theme [causes explained in terms of alternative events]:

8422 Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume]
15468 Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
8437 The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
8438 A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
8396 Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
8429 Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
8428 Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
9659 Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
8608 Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
8584 Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
8432 Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]
11961 Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
16847 Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
16215 Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley]
9445 We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford]
4774 Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
16250 We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin]
16248 Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin]
16268 The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin]
16267 If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin]
16269 If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin]
17526 The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird]
14573 Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum]
14572 Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum]
14574 Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum]
22902 Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon]
23015 The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are [Baron/Miller]
23016 Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system [Baron/Miller]
22634 Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson]
22635 People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson]
22637 Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson]