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Single Idea 8426
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
]
Full Idea
One event is the cause of another iff there exists a causal chain leading from the first to the second.
Gist of Idea
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
Source
David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.200)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.200
A Reaction
It will be necessary to both explain and identify a 'chain'. Some chains are extremely tenuous (Alexander could stop a barrel of beer). Go back a hundred years, and the cause of any present event is everything back then.
The
37 ideas
with the same theme
[causes explained in terms of alternative events]:
8422
|
Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed
[Hume]
|
15468
|
Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions
[Martin,CB]
|
8437
|
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive
[Bennett]
|
8438
|
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence
[Bennett]
|
8396
|
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation
[Kim, by Tooley]
|
8429
|
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation
[Kim]
|
8428
|
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals
[Kim]
|
15553
|
Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events
[Lewis]
|
17525
|
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects
[Lewis, by Bird]
|
17524
|
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption)
[Lewis, by Bird]
|
8397
|
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't
[Tooley on Lewis]
|
8423
|
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations
[Lewis]
|
8426
|
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
[Lewis]
|
9659
|
Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either
[Lewis]
|
8608
|
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past
[Lewis]
|
8584
|
Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption
[Lewis]
|
8432
|
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around
[Horwich]
|
11961
|
Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa
[Molnar]
|
16847
|
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient
[Lipton]
|
16215
|
Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds?
[Hawley]
|
9445
|
We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value
[Mumford]
|
4774
|
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession
[Psillos]
|
16250
|
We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description
[Maudlin]
|
16248
|
Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests
[Maudlin]
|
16268
|
The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails
[Maudlin]
|
16267
|
If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual
[Maudlin]
|
16269
|
If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way
[Maudlin]
|
17526
|
The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition
[Bird]
|
14573
|
Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
14572
|
Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause?
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
14574
|
Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
22902
|
Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause?
[Bardon]
|
23015
|
The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are
[Baron/Miller]
|
23016
|
Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system
[Baron/Miller]
|
22634
|
Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals
[Ingthorsson]
|
22635
|
People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause
[Ingthorsson]
|
22637
|
Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual
[Ingthorsson]
|