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Single Idea 8426

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation ]

Full Idea

One event is the cause of another iff there exists a causal chain leading from the first to the second.

Gist of Idea

One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second

Source

David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.200)

Book Ref

'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.200

A Reaction

It will be necessary to both explain and identify a 'chain'. Some chains are extremely tenuous (Alexander could stop a barrel of beer). Go back a hundred years, and the cause of any present event is everything back then.

The 15 ideas from 'Causation'

9476 If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
8405 A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
4795 Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
8420 A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
8421 Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
8424 Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
8427 I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]