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Single Idea 8431
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
]
Full Idea
In reaction to two classic difficulties in Goodman's treatment of counterfactuals - the contenability problem and the explication of law - a radically different approach was instigated by Stalnaker (1968) and has been developed by Lewis.
Clarification
'contenability' concerns what other propositions are true if the counterfactual is
Gist of Idea
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis
Source
Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p208)
Book Ref
'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.208
A Reaction
[I record this for study purposes]
Related Idea
Idea 12191
Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
The
23 ideas
from Paul Horwich
2798
|
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
[Horwich]
|
2799
|
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
[Horwich]
|
8432
|
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around
[Horwich]
|
8431
|
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis
[Horwich]
|
9339
|
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds
[Horwich]
|
9341
|
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable
[Horwich]
|
9342
|
Understanding needs a priori commitment
[Horwich]
|
9331
|
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition?
[Horwich]
|
9333
|
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge
[Horwich]
|
9332
|
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around
[Horwich]
|
9334
|
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle
[Horwich]
|
23299
|
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences
[Horwich, by Davidson]
|
6332
|
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily
[Horwich]
|
6336
|
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth
[Horwich]
|
6337
|
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory
[Horwich]
|
6334
|
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?
[Horwich]
|
6335
|
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p
[Horwich]
|
6338
|
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning
[Horwich]
|
6339
|
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments
[Horwich]
|
6340
|
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture
[Horwich]
|
6341
|
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage
[Horwich]
|
6342
|
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction
[Horwich]
|
6344
|
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them
[Horwich]
|