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Single Idea 8439

[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events ]

Full Idea

Perhaps it is impossible that an event should have had a causal history different from the one that it actually had.

Gist of Idea

Maybe each event has only one possible causal history

Source

Jonathan Bennett (Event Causation: counterfactual analysis [1987], p.220)

Book Ref

'Causation', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Tooley,M. [OUP 1993], p.220


A Reaction

[He cites van Inwagen for this] The idea is analagous to baptismal accounts of reference. Individuate an event by its history. It might depend (as Davidson implies) on how you describe the event.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [what we should take events to consist of]:

Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons]
Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum]