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Single Idea 8449

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference ]

Full Idea

If the sense of a name was subjective, then the proposition and the thought would be subjective; the thought one man connects with this proposition would be different from that of another man. One man could not then contradict another.

Gist of Idea

Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible

Source

Gottlob Frege (Letters to Jourdain [1910], p.44)

Book Ref

'Meaning and Reference', ed/tr. Moore,A.W. [OUP 1993], p.44

A Reaction

This is an implicit argument for the identity of 'proposition' and 'thought'. This argument resembles Plato's argument for universals (Idea 223). See also Kant on existence as a predicate (Idea 4475). But people do misunderstand one another.

Related Ideas

Idea 223 If you deny that each thing always stays the same, you destroy the possibility of discussion [Plato]

Idea 4475 Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant]

The 17 ideas with the same theme [reference language has two components]:

15597 Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
17002 Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
18778 Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
7805 Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
4976 The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
4977 In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
4979 We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
8449 Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege]
16987 By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
3893 Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
2519 It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
2436 It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
3149 Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey]
12231 Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
16372 Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati]
16388 We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati]
16359 Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]